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ABSTRACT 
Most dispute resolution is settled by negotiation rather 
than litigation.  However, such bargaining often occurs in 
the shadow of the law. 
To help support interest-based negotiation, we explore the 
use of utility functions to support negotiation analysis.  
We discuss in detail a utility function we have developed 
in the area of family-law mediation.  This function is 
currently being used as the basis of an online dispute 
resolution system. 
Keywords 
utility functions, negotiation support systems, bargaining 
in the shadow of the law. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As Ross (1980) states the principal institution of the law 
is not trial; it is settlement out of court. To support this 
argument, Williams (1983) notes that whilst the figures 
may vary in different jurisdictions, of all the cases listed 
before the courts only about 5% of the cases are ever 
heard by the court and only 1% of the cases result in 
judicial decision-making. 
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A survey in The Netherlands (Velthoven and Ter Voert 2004) 
indicates that about 48% of all disputes were settled out of court 
and just 4% is decided by litigation. Thus, a major goal of useful 
legal advice should be to avoid litigation. Nevertheless, most 
research in the domain of Artificial Intelligence and Law has 
focused upon black letter law – an informal term indicating the 
basic principles of law generally accepted by the courts and/or 
embodied in the statutes of a particular jurisdiction (Black 
1990).   
Negotiation is a process where the parties involved modify their 
demands to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise 
(Kennedy et al 1984). The essence of negotiation is that there is 
no third party whose role is to act as facilitator or umpire in the 
communications between the parties as they attempt to resolve 
their dispute (Astor and Chinkin 2002).  
Folberg and Taylor (1984) define mediation as “a process by 
which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral 
person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order 
to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual 
settlement that will accommodate their needs”. Mediation 
emphasises the separation of issues of the dispute and develops 
options for the disputants.  Mediation most often is a voluntary 
and non-binding process in which a third party neutral assists the 
parties in formulating their own resolution of the dispute. It is a 
confidential process in which the confidentiality is protected by 
an agreement between the parties and the mediator or by statute 
(such as in Australia). The fundamental difference between 
negotiation and mediation is the presence of an impartial, neutral 
third party who is not a partisan for one of the disputants but 
rather assists both or all the parties towards reaching an 
agreement (Astor and Chinkin 2002).  
(Beardsley et al 2006) identify three forms of mediation: a) 
facilitative mediation – where mediators help the parties 
communicate but do not intervene in the proceedings; b) 
formulation – here mediators make a substantial contribution to 
the negotiation, they can perceive and propose new solutions; c) 
manipulative mediation – here the mediator uses his position 
and leverage to influence the outcome. 
Whilst the concept of negotiation has a long history1
The concept of bargaining in the shadow of the law is 
significant in the context of the negotiation of disputes.  
We shall introduce the notion of a utility function as a 
method for supporting such bargaining.  We examine, in 
detail, the utility function we have developed for interest-
based negation in the field of family law. We conclude by 
examining our current research on plea-bargaining. 
, the 
modern Alternative Dispute Resolution movement can be 
traced back to Sander (1976).  Mnookin and Kornhauser 
(1979) introduced the bargaining in the shadow of the 
trial concept. By examining the case of divorce law, they 
contended that legal rights of each party could be 
understood as bargaining chips that can affect settlement 
outcomes. Bibas (2004) has noted that some scholars treat 
plea-bargaining as simply another case of bargaining in 
the shadow of a trial. 
2. NEGOTIATION AND 
BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF 
THE LAW 
Walton and Mckersie (1965) propose that negotiation 
processes can be classified as distributive or integrative.  
In distributive approaches, the problems are seen as “zero 
sum” and resources are imagined as fixed: divide the pie.  
In integrative approaches, problems are seen as having 
more potential solutions than are immediately obvious 
and the goal is to expand the pie before dividing it.  
Parties attempt to accommodate as many interests of each 
of the parties as possible, leading to the so-called win-win 
or all gain approach.  As (Kersten 2001) notes although 
Walton and McKersie did not suggest one type of 
negotiation being superior to the other, over the years, it 
has become conventional wisdom that the integrative type 
allows for better compromises, win-win solutions, value 
creation and expanding the pie. (Fisher and Ury 1981) 
and (Lax and Sebenius 1986) discuss these issues in 
detail. 
Game theory, as opposed to behavioural and descriptive 
studies, provides formal and normative approaches to 
model bargaining. One of the distinctive key features of 
game theory is the consideration of zero-sum and non-
zero-sum games.  These concepts were adopted to 
distinguish between distributive and integrative processes.  
Limitations of game theory in providing prescriptive 
advice sought by disputants and their advisers on one 
hand, and the developments in multicriteria decision-
making and interactive methods on the other, provided the 
groundwork for negotiation analysis as discussed in 
(Raiffa 1982). 
(Bibas 2004) argues that the conventional wisdom is that 
litigants bargain towards settlement in the shadow of 
expected trial outcomes. In this model, rational parties 
forecast the expected trial outcome and strike bargains 
that leave both sides better off by splitting the saved costs 
of trial. … This shadow of trial model now dominates the 
                                                 
1 For example, Abraham and God negotiating in the 
Torah (or old Testament) re criteria for destroying Sodom 
and Gomorrah 
literature on civil settlements. In developing the concept, 
Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) treated the legal rights of each 
party as bargaining chips that affect settlement outcomes.   
Cooter et al (1982) discuss this issue for civil cases.  Posner 
(1973) claims that the usual approach to bargaining in the legal 
setting assumes that trial is caused by excessive optimism on 
behalf of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Posner (1995) 
focuses upon legal pragmatism and law and economics. He 
views law not as formalistic argumentation, but as competition 
for resources.  Under this model the competing parties have a 
utility function which they attempt to maximize. 
In discussing notions of justice in negotiation, Byrne and 
Cropanzano (2001) consider distributive, procedural and 
interactional justice.  Distributive justice concerns what is just or 
right with respect to the allocation of goods in a society. 
(Fletcher 1996) notes that distributive justice relies on the 
assumption that a central authority has control over all things, 
good and bad, that can be possessed.  The act of distribution is 
designed to realise a just relationship amongst two or more 
claimants. 
Procedural justice is concerned with making and implementing 
decisions according to fair processes. (Rawls 1971) argues that 
if the procedures for choosing principles of justice are fair, then 
the outcome will be just.  Interactional justice considers the 
degree to which the people affected by a decision are treated 
with politeness, dignity, and respect. It focuses on the 
interpersonal treatment people receive when procedures are 
implemented. In a related project, discussed in section 5, we are 
investigating the notions of procedural and distributive fairness 
in negotiations. 
In most legal domains, dispute resolution focuses upon 
bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, rather than integrative 
bargaining.  This point will be highlighted in our discussion of 
family mediation decision support systems. 
Given our goal is to provide tools to support negotiation, rather 
than merely replicate legal decision-making, we need to 
examine the notions of BATNAs and utility functions. In this 
paper we do not present a formal model on how to use utility 
functions in dispute resolution.  Rather, we argue that mediators 
and negotiators intuitively use certain techniques that inherently 
rely upon utility functions.  Thus we argue that an examination 
of utility functions is vital.  Our work on the Family_Winner and 
Family_Mediator projects (Zeleznikow and Bellucci 2006) is 
merely one such example. 
2.1. Developing BATNAs 
Fisher and Ury (1981) introduced the notion of a BATNA (Best 
Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) concept as a tool for 
negotiators to cope with power imbalances. They claim that, if 
negotiators do take account of their options outside a 
negotiation, they are better protected against agreements that 
should be rejected. It also helps them to reach agreements that 
better satisfy their interests. In order to assess whether an offer 
should be rejected, a party in a dispute has to establish what can 
be accomplished in alternative procedures to the one currently 
being conducted. Once the alternatives are known, these can be 
compared to what one expects to win by accepting an offer in 
the current procedure.  
In their development of a three step model for Online Dispute 
Resolution, (Lodder and Zeleznikow 2005) evaluated the order 
in which online disputes are best resolved. They 
suggested the following sequencing:  
1) First, the negotiation support tool should provide 
feedback on the likely outcome(s) of the dispute if the 
negotiation were to fail – i.e. the BATNA. 
2) Second, the tool should attempt to resolve any existing 
conflicts using dialogue techniques. 
3) Third, for those issues not resolved in step two, the tool 
should employ compensation/trade-off strategies in order 
to facilitate resolution of the dispute. 
4) Finally, if the result from step three is not acceptable to 
the parties, the tool should allow the parties to return to 
step two and repeat the process recursively until either the 
dispute is resolved or a stalemate occurs. 
The model suggests that an important first step in 
providing negotiation decision support is developing 
relevant BATNAs.   
2.2. BATNAs for Family Mediation and 
Plea-bargaining 
In the Split-Up project (Stranieri et al 1999) wished to 
model how Australian Family Court judges exercise 
discretion in distributing marital property following 
divorce.   They used machine learning to model how 
judges perform the distribution. Whilst the Split—Up 
system was not originally designed to support legal 
negotiation, it is capable of doing so.  Split—Up can be 
directly used to proffer advice in determining your 
BATNA. (Bellucci and Zeleznikow 2001) illustrate this 
point. 
Plea-bargaining is the process whereby the accused and 
the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually 
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court 
approval (Black 1990).  It usually involves the defendants 
pleading guilty to a lesser offence or to only one or some 
of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a 
lighter sentence than that possible for the graver charge.  
Without the concept of plea-bargaining, the United States 
Criminal system would grind to a halt. In the United 
States, Baldwin and McConville (1977) estimate that 
approximately 90% of guilty pleas are negotiated.  
Hall et al (2005) built a sentencing decision support 
system to help new defence lawyers at VLA make 
arguments to support their clients to receive the least 
onerous sentences. .  The system uses a combination of 
decision trees and argument trees (as proposed by 
(Toulmin 1958)). 
Vincent and Zeleznikow (2007) are constructing a plea 
negotiation support environment for Contest Mentions in 
the Victorian Magistrates’ Court and more broadly plea 
negotiations in other jurisdictions. The current system is 
intended to be used by VLA lawyers to support plea 
negotiations and train inexperienced advocates. The 
system consists of two major parts. The first part is a 
sentencing decision support system which provides 
information as to possible range of sentences and also the 
probability of attaining the recommended sentence. The 
second part is an environment for plea negotiation.  In this 
latter task, we are developing utility functions to support making 
trade-offs. 
Enhanced negotiation support can be provided by decision 
support systems. Decision support systems can provide an 
unbiased appraisal of an accused person’s situation. This can be 
performed by the provision of a BATNA, especially with respect 
to a possible sentence at the final disposition of the case. 
Organizing and prioritising the most important aspects for an 
appropriate outcome can bring about effective negotiation 
support. Considerations such as not receiving a conviction or 
keeping a fine as low as possible can be ordered and prioritized.  
Whilst others may disagree we view plea-bargaining as a form 
of negotiation that has benefits of administrative efficiency for 
the prosecution and provides certainty for the defence.  Of 
course plea bargaining can have negative consequences.  Gazal-
Ayal (2006) investigates the economics of plea bargaining.  He 
proposes having a partial ban on plea bargains, which prohibits 
prosecutors from offering substantial plea concessions. He 
argues that such a ban can act to discourage prosecutors from 
bringing weak cases and thus reduce the risk of wrongful 
convictions. Wright and Miller (2003) believe that pervasive 
harm stems from charge bargains due to their special lack of 
transparency. They argue that charge bargains, even more than 
sentencing concessions, make it difficult after the fact, to sort 
out good bargains from bad, in an accurate or systematic way. 
The recent case of David Hicks, an Australian citizen, captured 
in Afghanistan and held in Guantanamo Bay for five years as an 
unlawful combatant, illustrates the dangers of plea-bargaining. 
On March 26 2007, Hicks entered a guilty plea to the charge of 
providing material support for terrorism. Part of the bargain was 
that Hicks not communicate with the media for twelve months 
(coincidentally after a forthcoming Australian election).  The 
sentence appears lenient for the crime to which Hicks pleaded 
guilty.  On the other hand, if Hicks was coerced into pleading 
guilty, that would be a serious miscarriage of justice.  
Of course2
In (Zeleznikow et al 2007) we investigate bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law as one technique for dispute resolution.  In 
(Gray et al 2007) we investigate using integrative bargaining 
and the E-Ganges system to provide negotiation planning: 
planning to avoid rather than resolve disputes.  In this article, we 
argue that understanding utility functions is an important 
concept for developing negotiation support systems. 
 whilst BATNAs inform disputants’ decision-making, 
other factors are also taken into account.  These might include 
the cost of the trial (such as paying for lawyers, expert witnesses 
and in Australia the loser in a civil case pays the winner’s costs) 
the length of the trial, the emotional stress that the trial might 
place on the litigants and the danger that a judicial verdict might 
set a negative precedent for one of the litigants. 
3. UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
Utilitarianism was propounded by Jeremy Bentham and his 
followers. The principle of utility or ‘greatest happiness’ 
mandates actions which produce the greatest sum of happiness 
(or pleasure or preference-satisfaction) as added up for the 
citizenry in the aggregate (Bentham 1789).  The concept of 
utilitarianism as advocated by Bentham is in fact the basis of 
integrative or interest-based negotiation as proposed by Walton 
                                                 
2 As an anonymous referee poignantly noted 
and McKersie.  It is distinct from the zero-sum games (or 
indeed often lose-lose games once the cost of litigation is 
taken into account) of litigation. 
(von Wright 1972) claims that preferences are an 
important object of study in economic theory.  Modern 
decision theory has developed the new conceptions of 
utility functions and personal probabilities. In current 
economics and in decision theory, the utility of outcomes 
and attributes refers to their weight in decisions: utility is 
inferred from observed choices and is in turn used to 
explain these choices. Thus utility is a measure of the 
relative satisfaction gained by consuming different 
bundles of goods and services.  
More specifically, in the INSPIRE negotiation project 
(Kersten 2001), a utility function is a subjective 
measurement that expresses the relative value of different 
package by using a numerical scale. The minimum 
number expresses the least desirable and least preferred 
package. The highest number represents the most 
desirable and preferred package.   
(Wright 1999) states there is no independent weight given 
in the utilitarian theory to the distribution of happiness (or 
wealth or power) or to the promotion of individuals’ equal 
(positive and negative) freedom. (Raiffa 1982) argues that 
there are very few researchers who prefer to trust the 
recommendations of formal utility theory rather their own 
intuition. We do not argue that utility theory is the 
panacea for building interest-based negotiation support 
systems.  However, models that use utility theory can 
provide useful negotiation advice. 
In our discussion of utility functions, we focus upon the 
interests (in terms of optimizing their utility function) of 
the disputants, rather than being concerned with the 
interests of society.  In particular we shall focus upon a 
sophisticated utility function which we have developed to 
support family mediation.  We argue that a generalization 
of this function can be used to support online dispute 
resolution. 
Lawyers have been reluctant to use utility functions, 
because in general they are reluctant to commit 
themselves to general principles which could then be 
evaluated by users of legal services. Researchers in the 
psychology of decision-making (see (Raiffa 1982) and 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979)) have extensively used 
utility functions to model decision making.  (Pratt et al 
1964) jointly axiomatized utility and subjective 
probability as a prescriptive theory to guide decision 
making. (Raiffa 1968) illustrated that these ideals were 
operational. 
Utility functions are at the basis of negotiation decision 
support systems.  Whilst not directly mentioning utility 
functions, (Allen 1956) proposed the use of game theory 
to support labour negotiations.  He used game theory 
developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and 
adapted by Nash (1950) to model bargaining situations. 
Utility functions have been heavily used in economics.  
Their significance in this domain can be seen by the 
awarding of Nobel Prizes to Kenneth Arrow (1972), 
Herbert Simon (1978), John Nash (1994) and Daniel 
Kahnemann (2002). The main use of utility functions in 
law has been in the area of Law and Economics.  One of the 
major proponents of this approach has been Richard Posner (see 
(Posner 1998)). 
We cannot develop a generic utility function to be used in law.  
However, we do believe that utility functions in specific areas of 
law can be very useful.  For example, developing utility 
functions so that traffic fines can be determined which consider 
not only the nature of the offence, but on how the fine might 
affect the offender in terms of their personal financial situation, 
would be an important contribution for developing just legal 
systems. 
3.1. Some of examples of utility functions in 
legal domains 
Whilst utility functions have not been widely used in the legal 
domain, they do have some advocates. 
(Behrman and Davey 2001) developed utility functions for 
evaluating the value of eye-witness identification.  Their study 
analyzed 271 actual police cases in order to address several 
prevalent issues in the eyewitness literature. Suspect 
identification rates were obtained for 289 photographic lineups, 
258 field showups, 58 live lineups, and 66 lineup identifications 
preceded by earlier identifications. Suspect identification rates 
were assessed for 3 levels of extrinsic evidence: no extrinsic 
evidence, evidence of minimal probative value, and evidence of 
substantial probative value. The suspect identification rates for 
the photographic lineups were assessed as a function of delay, 
same vs. cross-race conditions, witness type, and weapon 
presence. Suspect identification rates declined significantly over 
time; suspect identification rates were significantly greater for 
the same-race condition. Suspect identification rates were much 
greater for field showups than photographic lineups, 76% vs. 
48% 
(Jouini et al 2005) consider the problem of optimal risk sharing 
of some given total risk between two economic agents 
characterized by law-invariant monetary utility functions. They 
provided an explicit characterization in the case where both 
agents’ utility functions are co-monotone. 
(Posner 1993) examined how to explain judicial behaviour in 
economic terms. He argued that judges’ voting behaviour should 
be conceptualised by consumption and that judges avoid the 
hard work and hassle involved in writing opinions.  
(Foxall 2004) developed a judicial utility function which 
included judicial and non-judicial income and consumption.  
Part of the consumption occurs during leisure time but a 
proportion occurs in working time (e.g. voting, reputation, 
avoidance of criticism). He argued that the extent to which a 
judge experiences judicial work as laborious depends on her 
cognitive style: adaptors and innovators are expected to 
conceptualise and experience the detailed work of opinion 
writing in different ways and thus to have distinct preferences 
for competing sources of utility. 
(Gazal-Ayal 2006) proposes having a partial ban on plea 
bargains, to discourage innocent defendants from pleading 
guilty.  He argues that the law can address this concern by 
providing prosecutors with incentives to select cases for a plea 
bargain in which the probability of guilt is high. By restricting 
the permissible sentence reduction in a plea bargain the law can 
preclude plea bargains in cases where the probability of 
conviction is low (L cases). The prosecutor will therefore 
be forced to – (1) select fewer L cases and proceed to trial 
with these cases; or (2) select more cases with a higher 
probability of conviction (H cases) that can be concluded 
via a less-costly plea bargain. As long as the probability 
of conviction is positively correlated with the probability 
of guilt, this selection-of-cases effect implies a reduced 
number of innocent defendants will accept plea bargains. 
(Gazal-Ayal 2006) and (Bar-Gill and Gazal-Ayal 2006) 
have developed utility functions to support plea-
bargaining through the use of partial differential 
equations. 
4. UTILITY FUNCTIONS AS 
USED IN FAMILY MEDIATION 
4.1. The Family_Winner system 
Bellucci and Zeleznikow (2006) observed that an 
important way in which family mediators encourage 
disputants to resolve their conflicts is through the use of 
compromise and trade-offs. Once the trade-offs have been 
identified, other decision-making mechanisms must be 
employed to resolve the dispute. They noted that while it 
appears counterintuitive: 
•  The more issues and sub-issues in dispute, the easier 
it is to form trade-offs and hence reach a negotiated 
agreement, and 
•  They choose as the first issue to resolve the one on 
which the disputants are furthest apart – one party 
wants it greatly, the other considerably less so. 
In assisting the resolution of a dispute, Family_Winner 
(Belluci and Zeleznikow 2006) asks the disputants to list 
the items in dispute and to attach importance values to 
indicate how significant it is that the disputants be 
awarded each of the items. The system uses this 
information to form trade-off rules. The trade-off rules are 
then used to allocate issues according to a “logrolling” 
strategy3
Family_Winner accepts as input a list of issues and 
importance ratings that represent a concise evaluation of a 
disputant’s preferences. In forming these ratings, the 
system assumes that the disputants have conducted a 
comparison of the issues.  As noted by (Sycara 1993), 
bargainers are constantly asked if they prefer one set of 
outcomes to another. Thus Sycara suggests considering 
two issues at a time, assuming all others are fixed. 
Family_Winner uses a similar strategy in which pair-wise 
comparisons are used to form trade-off strategies between 
two issues. 
. 
The trade-offs pertaining to a disputant are graphically 
displayed through a series of trade-off maps (Zeleznikow 
and Bellucci  2003).  Their incorporation into the system 
                                                 
3 Logrolling is a process in which participants look 
collectively at multiple issues to find issues that one party 
considers more important than does the opposing party. 
Logrolling is successful if the parties concede issues to 
which they give low importance values. See (Pruitt 1981). 
enables disputants to visually understand trade-off opportunities 
relevant to their side of the dispute. A trade-off is formed after 
the system conducts a comparison between the ratings of two 
issues. The value of a trade-off relationship is determined by 
analyzing the differences between the parties, as suggested by 
(Mnookin et al 2000). 
Consider as an example a family law dispute in which the wife 
is awarded the marital home and the husband awarded the 
holiday house. Depending on how the husband and wife rated 
various issues, one might be compensated following the 
allocation of property to the other. Compensation is considered 
as an external reward, one that is not related to the issues on the 
table. Family_Winner awards compensation to parties that have 
either lost an issue they regard as valuable, or have been 
allocated an issue of little importance. 
The system implements compensation by either increasing or 
decreasing a party’s rating. It is then expected that changes 
made to a rating will influence the decision of a future 
allocation. The amount of any compensation resulting from the 
triggering of a trade-off has been empirically determined from 
an analysis of data. This means that even though we have tried 
to explicitly define utility functions, they are indeed developed 
implicitly and are only approximations. 
The input consists of:  
• Issues in dispute.  Both disputants are requested to enter the 
issues in dispute. The issues may consist of a series of sub-
issues. 
• Ratings.  Once the issues and sub-issues have been 
established, the user enters numbers that reflect the 
importance of an issue or sub-issue (this is called a rating).   
• Mutual Exclusiveness.  An issue is mutually exclusive of 
another issue, if as a result of allocating one issue, both 
issues are allocated simultaneously.  For example, the 
issues of primary residency and visitation rights to children 
are mutually exclusive, since if one parent has residency, 
then the other, save for exceptional circumstances, is 
allocated visitation rights. 
Unlike the case of input, the method by which output is 
presented by the system is not characterised by a sequential 
standard process.  These outputs include:  
• Trade-off Maps.  Once new information has been entered 
into the system, or changes occur in the negotiation (for 
example to ratings following an allocation), the system 
displays two Trade-off Maps.  Each map represents the 
preferences and trade-offs pertaining to a party.  These 
diagrams provide disputants with an opportunity to 
diagrammatically assess their position in relation to all 
other issues.  
• Summary Report.  Once an issue has been allocated to a 
party, a summary report describing the current state of issue 
allocation with respect to the preferences of both parties is 
displayed.  The summary report lists the issue recently 
allocated and the party to which it is allocated, all prior 
allocations, the value of issues before allocation and their 
current value, and a hierarchical map of all issues yet to be 
resolved. 
Family_Winner uses the Issue Decomposition Hierarchy (as 
described in (Bellucci 2004)) to store all issues (and sub-issues) 
and makes use of Trade-off Maps to deliver a compensation 
strategy.  The output consists of a list of allocations, 
which form the basis of the advice provided by the 
system. 
4.2. Family_Winner’s utility function 
We now give an implicit description of utility functions 
developed for the Family_Winner System.  A discussion 
of the additional Family_Mediator utility function will be 
held in section 4.3. 
4.2.1. Defining the problem 
The set of issues in dispute is: D = X ∪ Y where X = {X1, 
X2, … , Xn} is the set of issues that H sees as in dispute 
and Y = {Y1, Y2, … , Ym} is the set of issues that W sees 
as in dispute.  H and W give a significance value (rating) 
to each of the issues in D = {D1, D2, … , Dk} where m, n 
≤ k ≤ m + n. These significance values (or ratings) are 
denoted xD = {xD1, xD2 , … , xDk} and yD = {yD1, yD2 , … , 
yDk} respectively. 
The function [1] normalises each party’s significance 
values, so that they both sum to one hundred.   
NEW(xDi) = (xDi * 100)/ Σ xDi and NEW(yDi)   = (yDi * 
100)/ Σ yDi where i ε {1, 2, …, k}           [1]     
Each issue can be decomposed into sub-issues Di = {Di,1, 
…, Ddi,,g(i)},  where g(i) is the number of sub-issues for 
issue Di. 
The rating of an issue refers to the value of an issue to a 
party.  The rating of a parent issue is its numerical rating 
provided by disputants, while the rating of a sub-issue is 
represented by a percentage of the parent issue’s rating. 
The value of sub-issues, with respect to the rating of their 
parent issues is calculated next and is defined as a P-
rating.   
So the initial issue (such as child welfare) is now deleted 
from the list of issues to be considered and replaced by 
the sub-issues.  The p-ratings take into account the ratings 
of both issues and sub-issues. P-ratings incorporate the 
influence of a parent issue to form the rating of a sub-
issue.  P-ratings are calculated according to the following 
equation:  
If sub-issue Di is given ratings {xDi,1, …, xDi,g(i))} where Σ 
xDi,j= 100; and {yDi,1, …, yDi,g(i))} where Σ yDi,j= 100; then 
the p-rating for Xdi,j is xdi * xdi,j /100 and the p-rating for 
Ydi,j is ydi * ydi,j /100                                [2]                  
It should be noted that only the ratings of the initial issues 
and sub-issues are normalised.  So after the initial 
normalisation, there is no reason why ratings or 
subratings should sum to 100. 
Example
4.2.2. Choosing the order of allocation 
: Suppose, Party H gives issue1 a rating of 60, 
and issue2 a rating of 40.  Suppose further that issue 1 has 
sub-issues 11 and 12 and that party H gives them ratings 
of 10 and 90 respectively. Then Issue11 has a p-rating of 
6 (10% of 60 = 6), and Issue12 has a p-rating of 54 (90% 
of 60 = 54).   
The order in which issues are considered for 
decomposition or allocation is then calculated.  
Specifically, the function described in [3], choose(i)  
calculates the numerical difference between the ratings set by 
both parties towards the same issues. 
Let set D* = {d1, d2, …, dk}  be the set of differences between 
the ratings of the issues in dispute, where di = |xDi – yDi | with i ε 
{1, 2, …, k}. The issue with the highest di value will be 
presented first.   
choose(1) = max {di: 1<= i <= k}    
The choose function, choose (i), for i > 1, will operate on 
revised ratings.  So choose(2) will be the maximum of the 
differences in revised ratings with: (a) The first issue allocated is 
removed from the list of revised ratings; (b) The revised ratings 
following the allocation of the first issue are used.  The function 
is defined recursively. [3] 
A brief discussion of revised ratings will be conducted in 4.2.5. 
The mediators and disputants can choose to either decompose 
the issue into sub-issues or directly allocate it.  
Example
4.2.3. Allocating Issues  
: Suppose Party H has issue1 with value of 60, issue2 
with value of 40 and issue3 with a value of 0.  Party W has 
issue1 with a value of 50, issue2 with a value of 30 and issue3 
with a value of 20.  The difference calculation for issue1 is 10, 
while the corresponding calculation for issue2 is 10 and the 
corresponding calculation for issue3 is 20.  Therefore D is the 
set {10,10,20}.  Since issue3 has the highest value of 20 in set 
D, the system will suggest to the disputants that they negotiate 
over issue3 first.   
Once a decision on which issue to distribute has been made, the 
issue needs to be distributed.  In the above example, issue3 is 
distributed first.  H had a rating of 0 for issue3 whilst W gave it 
a rating 20.  Thus W is awarded issue3. H needs to be 
compensated because W is awarded issue3.   
Thus at any step, we need a function to keep a record of how 
many points each disputant has received at time t.  Let us call 
this function GAIN(z,t). Our eventual goal is to have 
GAIN(H,FINAL) fairly close to GAIN(W,FINAL). [4] 
In the example above, GAIN(H,1) = 0 and GAIN (W,1) = 20. 
4.2.4. The top level utility function 
If an issue does not require decomposition or has been sub-
divided appropriately, the issue is allocated according to the 
issue’s importance rating.  The ratings of issues are hence 
compared.  Essentially, the party whose rating is greatest is 
allocated the issue.  If the ratings are of equal value, then the 
next issue to be considered for allocation is presented.  
Formally, this algorithm is presented as follows:  
If xDi  ≥ yDi then issue i is allocated to H, else issue i is allocated 
to W, where i ε {1, 2, ..., k}   [5] 
Once an issue (or issues) has been allocated, the remaining 
issues are affected to varying degrees, according to trade-offs 
executed as a result of the allocation.  The extent to which the 
ratings of issues change is dependent on whether an issue is lost 
or gained, the ratings of issues forming trade-offs, and strength 
of the trade-off (represented by relationship figures).  The values 
of these variables are combined to form a series of graphs, used 
to extract the amount of change affecting ratings.   
4.2.5. Performing Trade-Offs 
Once the issues and sub-issues have been allocated we 
need to perform trade-offs to compensate the loser of the 
issue or sub-issue. To support the awarding of 
compensation, we develop Trade-off Maps.  These 
diagrams are indicative of possible trade-offs between 
pairs of issues.   
The trade-off maps were empirically developed using data 
provided to us by four different sources: (a) Thirty-six 
surveys of mediator questionnaires obtained from the 
department of Law and Legal Studies at La Trobe 
University; (b) a series of interviews conducted with four 
Family Law mediators from the Family Mediation 
Centres in both Noble Park and Ringwood, Victoria, 
Australia; (c) a set of six hundred mediation transcripts 
provided by the Australian Institute of Family Studies (d) 
Family Law negotiation simulations we conducted, held 
in conjunction with the Law School at Monash 
University, Melbourne, Australia and with the Graduate 
School of Business at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan, 
Israel.   
A detailed discussion of trade-off maps can be found in 
(Bellucci 2004). It involves a discussion of the Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (Saaty 1980) and the development of a 
matrix of pair-wise comparison of issues and sub-issues. 
The utility function which advises upon the allocation of 
issues to H and W is given in [5].  [1] performs 
normalization, [2] calculates p-ratings, [3] defines the 
metric which is used to decide which issue is first 
allocated, whilst [4] stores the sum of the values that each 
party has received.  A brief discussion of how ratings are 
revised using trade-off maps is also given.  There is no 
claim that the functions are in any way optimal. 
The utility functions developed in the Family_Winner 
project try to improve the user's satisfaction with the 
family mediation process. Thiessen and MacMahon 
(2000) developed the SmartSettle system which is also a 
negotiation support that models integrative bargaining.  
There is no claim that the function is optimal. The 
Family_Winner algorithm was evaluated in (Bellucci and 
Zeleznikow 2006). 
Following advice from family-law lawyers and mediators 
at Victoria Legal Aid and Relationships Australia, we 
always choose Child Welfare Related issues as the first 
issue to be allocated.  However, in our generic model of 
the development of decision support systems for 
bargaining in the shadow of the law, we make no such 
presumption. 
4.3. The Family_Mediator System – 
adding facilitation the Family_Winner 
system 
The Family_Winner system was designed to help 
mediators provide advice about dispute resloution 
through the use of trade-offs.  The system focused 
upon trying to determine each of the disputant’s interests 
and then uses utility or game theory to suggest good 
solutions (not necessarily optimal).   It is an example of 
facilitative mediation. 
However, Australian family law focuses upon the paramount 
interests of the children, not upon the interests of the parents. 
Thus family law mediators need to influence the parents to 
propose a settlement that best meets the needs of the children.  
Hence, family law mediators are engaging in formulation rather 
than in facilitative mediation. 
The Queensland Branch of Relationships Australia wants to use 
a modified version of Family_Winner to provide decision 
support for their clients.  The application domain concerns 
agreements about the distribution of marital property.  Instead of 
Family_Winner attempting to meet both parents’ interests to 
basically the same degree (i.e. have GAIN(H,FINAL) fairly 
close to GAIN(W,FINAL), mediators at Relationships Australia 
determine what percentage of the common pool property the 
wife should receive (e.g. 60%).  This advice can also be 
tendered by the Split_Up system. 
A major issue of concern to Relationships Australia is how to 
equate the percentage of property with the interests of the 
couple.  It is not necessary that there be a direct connection 
between the financial value of an item and the points-value that 
each party in the dispute attaches to the item.  Indeed, a major 
issue in dispute may involve determining the value of the item.  
For example following a divorce, the husband may agree that 
the wife should be awarded the marital home.  In this case it 
would be in his interests to overvalue the house (say he suggests 
it is worth $1,200,000) whilst it is in the wife’s interests to 
undervalue the house (say she suggests it is worth $800,000).  
So how can our new system (Family_Mediator) help resolve the 
issue? 
Our strategy is:    [6] 
a) The mediator involved in helping resolve the dispute makes 
decisions about how many points the husband and wife 
should each receive.  The mediator could use the Split_Up 
system if this is seen as beneficial.  Say the wife receives 
X% and Husband (100 – X) %.  
b) The mediator decides on the financial value of each item in 
dispute. 
c) Both the Husband and Wife give points to each of the items 
in dispute4
d) The Family_Mediator system then suggests trade-offs and 
compensations so that the wife receives T*(50 + X) points 
and the husband receives T*(150 - X) points where T is the 
number of points each party would receive under the 
original Family_Winner system.   
. 
The new utility function developed in Family_Mediator (which 
is defined in (a), (b), (c), (d) of [5]) allows the concept of 
interest-based negotiation as developed in Family_Winner to be 
integrated with notions of justice.   
5. FUTURE RESEARCH AND 
CONCLUSION 
Whilst (Ross 1980) claims the principal institution of the law is 
not trial; but settlement out of court, nevertheless, legal 
negotiation often occurs in the shadow of the law.  Disputants 
                                                 
4  As in the entering of the points into the Family_Winner 
system, the points should sum to 100.  If this is not the case, 
then the numbers are scaled so that they sum to 100. 
often calculate their BATNAs and then conduct interest-
based negotiation to achieve their goals. 
We have seen that utility functions can provide useful 
decision support for conducting the trade-off process 
interest based facilitative mediation. As part of a project 
on supporting trade-offs and compromises for integrative 
bargaining, we have developed utility functions that 
advise upon family-law mediation.  The utility functions 
try to improve the user's satisfaction.  There is no claim 
that the function is optimal. An extension of 
Family_Winner, Family_Mediator engages in formulative 
mediation. 
The Family_Winner algorithm was evaluated in (Bellucci 
and Zeleznikow 2006). 
In (Lodder and Zeleznikow 2005) we have shown how 
the family-mediation utility function can be extended to a 
generic online dispute resolution environment.  In 
conjunction with a commercial partner (Creative Binary 
Engineering) we are developing a generic web-based 
system to provide advice about dispute resolution using 
an interest-based approach.  
As noted in section 2.2, plea-bargaining can be seen as a 
form of negotiation that has benefits of administrative 
efficiency for the prosecution and provides certainty for 
the defence. Generally, the interests of the parties focus 
upon reduced sentences and reducing costs. In other 
negotiation domains, in particular industrial relations and 
family relationships, more complex trade-offs can be 
employed to meet the parties’ interests. 
The Australian Workplace Relations Amendment (Work 
Choices) Bill 2005 encourages employers and employees 
to conduct direct negotiations about employment 
conditions.  Previously, under a centralized decision-
making process, the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission made ruling on disputes. Whilst the new 
legislation creates a Fair Pay Commission to ensure that 
all agreements meet five basic principles, the new 
legislation encourages interest-based negotiation rather 
than arbitrated or judicial decisions. It is thus an excellent 
domain in which to use utility functions to provide 
Negotiation Decision Support.  In conjunction with the 
School of Applied Economics at Victoria University, we 
are building a tailored system adapted from our generic 
web-based system to advise upon enterprise bargaining.  
In a related project, we are investigating principles for the 
successful negotiation of Information Technology 
Outsourcing Agreements. 
5.1. Future Research 
We are about to commence a project that investigates the 
fairness and consistency of negotiation support systems in 
the legal domain.  In a project with title ‘Developing 
negotiation support systems in law which encourage more 
consistent and principled outcomes’ we argue that unless 
negotiation support systems are seen to advocate 
outcomes which arise from consistent and principled 
advice, disputants will be reluctant to use them.  Thus we 
propose conducting research that will develop measures 
for assessing the outcomes of online negotiation in the 
legal domains of sentencing, plea bargaining and family 
mediation. Such measures will form the basis of a new model 
for evaluating justice and consistency within online dispute 
resolution systems. The model will inform the construction of 
fairer and more consistent systems of IT-based negotiation 
support in the future. 
To meet this goal we will: 
1. Develop models of consistency and justice based on two 
very distinct legal domains: sentencing and family law. Further, 
the knowledge about these domains will be shared from three 
distinct Common Law jurisdictions: Australia, Israel and USA. 
2. Develop information retrieval techniques to extract 
knowledge from textual legal and negotiation data. 
3. Use KDD techniques (such as association rules, Bayesian 
belief networks and neural networks) to compare litigated and 
negotiated family law cases. 
4. Develop models of disputation and negotiation in both 
family law and sentencing.  These models will then be tested to 
examine how closely they align with the notion of Bargaining in 
the Shadow of the Law (as compared to ‘pure’ interest-based 
negotiation). 
5. Use Lodder and Zeleznikow’s three step model for an 
Online Dispute Resolution Environment and Toulmin’s theory 
of argumentation to construct a generic online dispute resolution 
environment.  The development of such an environment on 
which to place various negotiation support systems will increase 
users’ access to justice. 
6. Develop and evaluate specific sentencing and negotiation 
support systems using our newly developed Online Dispute 
Resolution Environment. 
In a second project, in conjunction with industry partners 
Relationships Australia and Victoria Body Corporate we are 
developing negotiation support systems to enable the 
continuation of constructive relationships following disputes. 
Relationships Australia is one of Australia’s primary providers 
of family counseling and family mediation services.  Its 
Queensland branch (http://www.relationships.com.au/who-we-
are/state-and-territory-organisations/qld) runs Family 
Relationship Centres. Mr. Shane Klintworth, director of the 
Queensland Branch of Relationships Australia became aware of 
the interest-based negotiation support system Family_Winner 
when it won the ABC Television show section of the New 
Inventors program 
(http://www.abc.net.au/newinventors/txt/s1504763.htm) 
screened on 16 November 2005.  Mr. Klintworth saw the 
benefits to Relationships Australia of a system that could 
enhance interest based negotiation. However, he also saw the 
need to emphasise the paramount interests of the children in any 
system.  While meeting parental desires is important, meeting 
children’s needs is paramount.  Further, especially when the 
divorcing couple has children, it is vital to encourage a 
harmonious on-going relationship between the parents. 
Victoria Body Corporate (http://www.vbcs.com.au/) a medium 
size company offering personalised management services to 
bodies corporate, strata title units and company share properties. 
A major facet of its role is the successful resolution of disputes 
amongst body corporate members.  Because, in general, the 
disputants live in the body corporate (and hence in close 
proximity to each other) it is important that disputes be resolved 
so that the body corporate members can continue with 
harmonious relationships.  With this in mind, Mr. Herman 
Klein, director of Victoria Body Corporate (VBC) wishes to 
develop software that can help his managers amicably resolve 
disputes. Mr. Klein also believes that the innovative 
application of negotiation support systems will give him a 
marketing advantage over other body corporate 
companies. 
In this project we wish to combine integrative bargaining, 
bargaining in the shadow of the law and formulation to 
develop decision support systems that support mediation 
and negotiation, specifically in body corporate and family 
disputes.  We will: 
a) develop negotiation support systems that support 
formulation: both in Family Law and Body Corporate 
disputes. The systems will respect ethical and legal 
principles and rely upon processes that are not only fair 
but are perceived by the parties to be fair. 
b) construct negotiation support systems that provide 
planning advice to help avoid disputes rather than 
resolve conflicts. 
c) develop an integrated Online Dispute Resolution 
environment that provides relevant legal knowledge, 
allows for communication and provides decision 
support tools. 
d) Use knowledge discovery from databases techniques to 
try and learn how mediators provide advice. 
e)  Use the techniques of Hall et al (2003), to thoroughly 
evaluate and re-engineer our negotiation support 
systems.  
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